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Bqiis AND NOTES; ImLLIED AUTHORITY To FILL Up BLANxxs.
-Moore v. .enshaw, 55 N. E. 236 (1899). This was a suit on a
note of which one Elwood Moore was the maker. The appellant
(defendant) was Moore's surety on the note ; the appellee (plaintiff)
was the payee. The note in question was given to satisfy three
other notes, which M[oore was unable to meet. All the parties to
the instrument, including the appellant, agreed that the note should
bear 8 per cent interest; but after the note was executed it was discovered that the rate of interest had not been specified. Then Moore,the maker, inserted the figure "8," heing requested to do so by the ap182
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pellee. This insertion was made without consulting the appellant
(surety), but it was apparently in pursuance of the previous agreement, to which he was a party. The lower court did not believe
that, under these circumstances, the surety had a good defence ; but
he appealed, and in the present case the lower court was reversed
and judgment given for the appellant. The ground of the decision
was that there had been material alteration of the note, which released the appellant from liability.
The case does not seem reconcilable with the authorities. The
court cites a number of cases in support of its decision, but upon
examination it is found they do not support. They are all in affirmance of a proposition which, while it is undeniably good law, is
not applicable to the point in question ; because prior to the application, it presumes a state of facts which is not present here. That
is, that the alteration be made without authority. After sayingthat
a material alteration will avoid a note, the court says: "It is a
material alteration to add an interest clause... " and proceeds to
cite cases.
Hart v. Oeler, 80 Ind. 83 (1881), held that crossing out the
words, "Interest on this note has been paid to maturity," discharged
the defendant upon his previously made contract of indorsement.
There was no express or implied consent to the alteration.
In Shank v. Albert, 47 Ind. 461 (1874), Schwind v. Hacket, 54
Ind. 248 (1876), and Brown v. Mitchell, 79 Ind. 84 (1881), the
facts were the same, even as to the rate of interest inserted. In each
case the holder inserted the words "at 10 per cent int.," which would
seem to be a popular proceeding in Indiana. The judges held very
unanimously and very properly that this innocent pleasantry upon
the part of the holder released the maker from all liability upon his
instrument.
With a pleasant sense of variety we note that in the case of
Bou-stead v. Cuyler, 116 Pa. 551 (1887), the rate inserted was 6
per cent (" with interest at six per cent until paid "), while in Hart
v. Clouser,30 Ind. 210 (1868), the holder decided upon the rate of 8
per cent. It was decided in both cases that the notes were avoided,
releasing, in the former case, the maker, in the latter, the surety.
In citing these cases the'court apparently lost sight of a great distinguishing feature between' them and the case under its consideration, i. e., the previous agreement. In no one of the cases cited was
there any authority to make the alteration, either express or implied.
But what was done in the present 'case, Moore had authority to do,
implied from the previous agreement to which the appellant was a
party. By filling in the blank, Moore made instrument conform to
the true intention of all the parties as evidenced by the agreement.
His right to do this is supported. by many cases.
Without more than mentioning the distinction to be taken between making an alteration-in the cases cited, inserting an entire
interest clause-and merely filling in a blank-here inserting the
figure" 8" in an already existing clause,-although the distinction
is by no means unimportant (Vosher v. Webster, 8 Cal. 109), we
pass to the consideration of two other cases cited by the court, which
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although open to the same objection as those already mentioned, as
iar as their bearing upon the present case is concerned, yet deserve
more than mere mention because of the suggestion in each, of the
principle upon which Moore v. Renshaw should have been decided.
In Palmerv. Poor, 121 Ind. 136 (1889), the insertion of the figure
"8," "without the knowledge or consent of the maker," was held to be
such a material alteration that no recovery could be had. It is
quite plain from the opinion of the court that if there had been any
such prior agreement as in Moore v. Henshaw, the decision would
have been different. Says the court in speaking of the case of Marshall v. Drescher,68 Ind. 359, and distinguishing it from the case
then deciding, " . . . there the circumstances were such as to create

the implication that the holder of the note had authority to fill the
blank left in the instrument, and it was upon this ground that the
note there under consideration was held valid." Thus clearly showing that if any such implied authority had beefi present in Palmer v.
Poor the result would have been different.
The other case is De Pauw v. Bank, 126 Ind. 553, 25 N. E. 705
(1890). There the note was complete in -all its terilis. It was indomed in blank by the defendant. The decision was that the maker
had no authority, implied from the fact that the indorsement
was in blank, to agree with the payee that the indorser should be
liable as surety. How this case supports the decision in Moore v.
H.enshaw, it is somewhat difficult to see. Indeed, in one part of the
opinion it is said, "It is undoubtedly the law, that where one . . •
leaves blanks in a note necessary to be filled . . . ". he thereby

clothes the holder'with implied authority to fill those blanks."
There was stated the principle of law which should govern Moore
v. Renshaw. In Hervey v. Hervey, 15 Maine 357 (1839), it was
said that the holder of a bill has the right to alter it and correct
mistakes if he thereby makes the instrument conform to what all
parties to it agreed or intended it should have been. Mo Craven,v.
Chisler,53 Miss. 542 (1876). " Where an alteration in a promissory
note conforms to true intention of the parties and is honestly made
• . . it will not viatiate the note. The law will presume assent."
Duker v. Franz, 7 Bush 273 (1870). Holder of a note may make
an alteration to correct a mistake if he make the instrument conform,
etc. See also Fisherv. Webster, 8 Cal. 109 (1857), and Cole v.
Hills, 44 N. H. 227 (1862). Connor v. Routh, 8 Miss. 176 (1843).
The insertion of words and figures which have been left out is no
defence. This note was payable "24 after date." Holder
was allowed to insert the word months." Ames v. Colburn, 11
Gray 390 (1865). Alteration was made in date of a note which
had been antedated. This was allowed as making the note conform
to the true intention of the parties. Boyd v. Brotherson, 10 Wendell 93 (1832). A note was for "eightdollars." The holder
was allowed to insert "hundred," on proof that that was intent of
parties. Hansom v. Hansom, 41 Ga. 303 (1869). Maker of a note
upon which the defendant was surety, introduced a clause making it
payable in gold. Whether this invalidated the note was said to
depend upon whether such was the original understanding. "A mere
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reduction to writing by the principle of what was in fact the agreement of the parties, would not be a change of contract." See also
Clute v.Small, 17 Wendell 238 ; Hunt v. Adams, 6 Mass. 519 ; Am.
and Eng. Enc. of Law, 1 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 339; 2 Ed. Vol. 4, p. 153
N. 1 ; Lownes v. Freer, 4 Ill. App. 547. Parsons on Bills and
Notes, p. 569: "Mistakes in a bill or note may be corrected,
and the alteration will not vitiate . . . The insertion of either
words or figures left out by mistake is no defence."
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NATURE OF LIABILITY FOR ASSESSMENT

De Weese v. Smith, 97 Fed. R. 309-1899.

ON

(Circ. Ct. W.

D. Mo.) This was an action at law by the receiver of an insolvent
national bank to enforce an assessment imposed by the Comptroller
of the Currency upon the stockholders. He had previously in an
action at law enforced an assessment of 75 per cent. The Circuit
Court, per Phillips, J., held that the recovery in the first action precluded any further proceedings. The subscribers for bank stock under See. 5151, Rev. St. U. S., enter into an agreement that they will be
liable severally to an assessment to the amount of the face value of
their stock in case of a deficit. But, to the mind of the court, this
contract is indivisible, and when once recovered upon can no longer
be made the basis of any action. They see nothing in the statute
to defeat the common law rule that a contract once recovered upon
cannot be again employed.
There are grave objections to such a view of the statute from the
standpoint of public policy. Furthermore, we do not believe that
the stockholder's liability is conformable to the strict rules of the
common law. The comptroller in his report for 1898 (vol. i, p.
xxxvi) speaks of the difficulties in discovering the exact deficit.
When the assessment is made after all the assets have been disposed
of there is little danger of mistake, but the assessment is generally
made before the liquidation of the assets. In these cases mistakes
are sure to arise. How can the receiver know whether all the
debtors will be solvent? In the meantime, must the creditors wait
before any assessment will be declared? Again, during such delay
many of the stockholders'are liable to become bankrupt. Should
any creditor be subjected to such a disadvantage? It seems only
just that the creditor should be entitled to a speedy assessment with
the privilege of a further one if the funds prove insufficient.
The court, in support of its contention, quotes the declaration of
the comptroller that it has been the practice of the comptroller to
regard such levy as irrevocable and unchangeable, although further
development may demonstrate error in the assessment. But it is
quite evident that the comptroller does not regard himself as bound
by any such precedent. He speaks of the inconvenience and injustice of the method, and feels that there is nothing in the decisions of
the Supreme Court to hold him to it.
Probably the most authoritative exposition of the law is the
decision of J. Swayne in Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 505 (1869).
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He says: "Where the whole amount is sought to be recovered the
proceeding must be at law. Where less is required the proceeding
may be in equity, and in such cases an interlocutory decree may be
taken for contribution and the case may stand over for the further
action of the court-if such action should subsequently prove to be
necessary-until the full amount of the liability is exhausted."
Despite what the court, in the case under review, said, we cannot
see what there is in the opinion to prevent the comptroller from
making a provisional assessment and enforcing its collection in an
action at law. The Supreme Court did recommend the action in
equity, but they evidently regarded the stockholder as liable up to
par value of his stock, although the first contributions desired were
for only part thereof.
The words of the same judge in a later case, U. S. v. Knox, 102
U. S., 422 (1880), are even more conclusive, viz: "Although
assessments made by the comptroller under the circumstances of
the first assessment in this case and all other assessments, successive
or otherwise, not exceeding the par value of all the stock of .the
bank, are conclusive upon stockholders, yet if he were to attempt to
enforce one made clearly and palpably contrary to the views
expressed, it cannot be doubted that a court of equity, if its aid
were invoked, would promptly restrain" him by injunction."
Although the case did not hinge upon this point, we feel that in the
absence of any express decision to the contrary, that the provisional
assessment can be justified.
The difficulties of the case may be solved to a great extent by
ascertaining the exact nature of the receiver's position. He is "the
statutory assignee of the association and is the proper party to institute all suits." Kennedy v. Gibson (supra) page 506. Under the
common law, the stockholder would have been liable directly to the
creditor, but under statute law and judicial construction the stockholder's liability has been turned into an asset of the bank: State v.
Union Stock Yards Bank (Ia.) 70 N. W., 752 (1897); Wilson v. Book
(Wash.) 43 Pac. (1896); Farmer'sLoan Co. v. Funk, 68 N.W. (Neb.)
520 (1896).
Now of this trust fund, the comptroller and, under him, the
receiver is the trustee, acting for the protection of the interests
involved. Comptroller's Rep. (supra). It is true that the court in
Kennedy v. Gibson (supra) held the comptroller's decision final
as to stockholders, under proper circumstances ; still there is nothing to lead us to agree with Judge Phillips in the present case that
that decision exhausts the comptroller's power. There seems to be
nothing in all the decisions to prevent the comptroller from either
laying a further assessment where such is needed or repaying such
sum to the stockholders as is not needed.
It is on this point of rebate to stockholders that we find an irreconcileable difference between the common law contract and the
stockholder's liability. The fact that there ever is a rebate shows
that the assessment is not enforced by the receiver by any absolute
right. He has collected more than was needed; he had a right to
only so much as was needed. The assessment, so far from being
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final, is always-due to the uncertainties in realizing the assets-provisional, subject to a rebate or an increase as the case may demand.
The rule contended for by the comptroller will be more equitable
to the stockholder than that laid down in the present case. If the
comptroller as trustee can enforce but one assessment, is it not his
duty to the creditors to make that levy sufficiently large? Where
any great uncertainty prevails would he not be justified in making
an a-sessment of 100 per cent where there may finally be a need for
only 50 per cent? In the meantime, the stockholder would be
deprived of the use of his money. It would be more convenient for
the stockholder to meet his liabilities as they are ascertained. In a
recent Minnesota case, the court has adopted the novel method of
granting judgment for the full liability of the stockholder; but the
creditor can enter up judgment only from time to" time under the
sanction of the court. When all the debts are met, the judgment is
satisfied upon the records. Harper v. Carroll,69 N. W. (Minn.)
611 (1896). But there are grave objections to allowing a judgment
to hang over a man's head in this manner. The method advocated
by the treasury authorities is more equitable, and, in the absence of
any decisions forbidding it, should be adopted.

